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Discounting plays a major role in the life cycle of environmental and natural resource 
policies. Evaluating centuries-scale problems like climate change with standard dis- 
count rates yields results that many find ethically unacceptable. Paradoxes abound. Low 
discount rates are urged for determining the net benefits of climate change, while 
households fail to undertake energy conservation actions that have payback periods of 
only a few years. Efforts to uncover discount rates from revealed and stated preferences 
suggest that a variety of confounding factors may be simultaneously in play. Common 
property resources provide an example of how market failures can lead to behavior 
consistent with extreme discounting that can be addressed through effective policy. 
Finally, politicians who make ultimate policy decisions may have incentives to act in 
accordance with discount rates not socially optimal. 
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As our scientific understanding of our long- 
term impact on the environment grows, so does 
our physical capacity for doing damage. It 
therefore comes as no surprise that in environ- 
mental economics, increasing attention is being 
paid to the evaluation of extremely long-lived 
problems, such as climate change, biodiversity, 
and nuclear waste disposal. 
The prevailing approach for evaluating envi- 
ronmental projects is to perform a benefit-cost 
analysis in which all of the associated costs and 
benefits over the lifetime of a project are esti- 
mated in current dollar values and then dis- 
counted using the standard exponential ap- 
proach with a social discount rate to determine 
the net present value of the project. If the result 
is positive, then the project is generally consid- 
ered a good investment. 
Unfortunately, applying this methodology us- 
ing standard discount rates on centuries-scale 
problems yields results that many, including 
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Consider climate change mitigation, which 
combines very high up-front costs with an ex- 
tremely long stream of benefits continuing 
centuries into the future. When discounted at 
standard constant discount rates, the power of 
compounding results in negligible present val- 
ues for these far-distant future benefits. Under 
standard exponential discounting, even the loss 
of  the  entire  current  world  output  200  years 
from now is discounted down to relatively small 
amounts under any rate commonly used for 
financial transactions. Consequently, there has 
been much focus recently on developing alter- 
native methods for discounting very long-term 
cost and benefit streams. 
A robust and broadly accepted approach to 
long-term discounting will significantly im- 
prove our ability to credibly evaluate policies 
for dealing with centuries-scale issues. How- 
ever, successful implementation of these policies 
will be contingent upon how individual agents 
respond to incentives. Therefore, in addition to 
developing a theoretical framework for discount- 
ing long-lived costs and benefits, it is also impor- 
tant to understand how individual agents make 
shorter-term intertemporal trade-offs. 
Consider, for example, the actions needed to 
reduce current greenhouse gas emissions. Even 
when the payback period in terms of lower 
utility bills is only a few years, most consumers 
do not purchase more energy efficient appli- 
ances. This suggests that consumers have very 
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high discount rates. A closer look indicates that 
there are complicating elements, including in- 
formation sets, budget constraints, transaction 
costs,  and  expectations  about  the  future  that 
play into these sorts of purchasing decisions. 
Another class of environmental problems in 
which discounting plays a crucial role is that of 
policies directed at reducing risks to life at 
different  time  horizons.  To  better  understand 
the appropriate social discount rates to apply to 
such policies and to predict the political support 
for life risk-reduction efforts, it is important to 
also understand how people discount in making 
life risk-reduction choices. It is interesting to 
note that some similar results emerge around 
inconsistencies in discounting in this context. 
Another example that demonstrates the impor- 
tance of individual discounting behavior is agent 
response to incentives involving common prop- 
erty resources. In unregulated common access 
fisheries for example, market failures lead to ex- 
treme discounting on the part of individual agents. 
Implementing effective policies can correct for 
these failures so that the discount rates implicit in 
fisheries’ behaviors are more consistent with so- 
cial discount rates. 
In the end it is politicians, not economists or 
scientists, who set the parameters of environmen- 
tal policies. It is interesting to ask questions about 
the temporal incentives these policymakers may 
be responding to. Do politicians tend to act in 
accordance with social discount rates, or are they 
selfishly motivated to stray from societal goals? 
The aim of this article is to explore discount 
rates in the life cycle of environmental policies. 
This paper is laid out as follows. First, the 
theoretical underpinnings of discounting as ap- 
plied to environmental policy evaluation of 
long-lived projects are reviewed, with climate 
change as the canonical example. Second, dis- 
count rates implicit in energy-consuming du- 
rables are considered as an example of agent 
response to policies. Third, measurement of im- 
plicit discount rates for health risks is addressed 
with a focus on stated preference (SP) data and 
the effort to infer discounting “preferences” 
from choice behavior. Fourth, common property 
access to a natural resource provides an example 
of the interaction between policies and agent dis- 
counting. Fifth, the key role of politicians and 
their implicit discount rates in implementing en- 
vironmental policies is examined. Finally, some 
concluding observations are offered. 
Controversial Role of Discounting in 
Environmental Project Evaluation 
 
The prevailing approach for evaluating envi- 
ronmental projects is to perform a benefit-cost 
analysis (Boardman et al., 2001; Pearce, Atkinson, 
& Mourato, 2006; Zerbe & Dively, 1994). All of 
the associated costs and benefits over the lifetime 
of a project are estimated in current dollar values 
and then discounted to determine the net present 
value of the project. If the result is positive, then 
the project is generally considered a good invest- 
ment. Debate in this literature focuses on three 
main facets of the problem. The first is how to 
measure benefits of environmental policies, par- 
ticularly those that are not priced in the market 
place. The second has to do with measuring costs, 
which would be more straightforward if there 
were no induced technological change over time 
or general equilibrium impacts on the larger eco- 
nomic system. The third is the appropriate dis- 
count rate or discount rate function to use in eval- 
uating environmental/natural resource policies 
with a strong time dimension. In this article, we 
largely ignore issues related to measuring benefits 





The standard economic approach to discount- 
ing is to use the Ramsey (1928) Rule, 
 
r          g, (1) 
 
where r is the social (or individual) rate of 
return,    the pure rate of time preference 
(which is often confused with r), g the growth 
of consumption, and   the elasticity of mar- 
ginal utility, defined in the sense of intertem- 
poral substitution.1 Net present value or dis- 
counted net benefits is then given by: 
 
  Bt     Ct / 1     r t,  (2) 
 
where Bt  represents the benefits of the policy at 
time t, Ct  is the cost at t, and the summation is 
 
 
1  Dasgupta (2005) provides an overview of how the Ram- 
sey formulation can be looked at from several different 
perspectives and a discussion of the technical difficulties 
including a consideration of the implication of infinite time 
horizons. 
CARSON AND ROTH TRAN  
 
performed from t    0 to T. In this sense, discount- 
ing using r defines how to trade off net benefits in 
different time periods. The functional form of (2) 
implies exponential discounting by the factor e   rt 
in continuous time models so that the only thing 
that matters in comparing two quantities is their 
distance in time. Intuitively, the Ramsey Rule says 
that discount rates are higher the more impatient 
people are, the faster the economy is growing, and 
the more people are willing to substitute consump- 
tion across time periods given a positive economic 
growth rate. It is straightforward to show that 
failure to use this rule leads to inefficient and/or 
inconsistent decision making. 
The Ramsey Rule embodies two key concepts: 
, a preference component, and   g, a component 
involving the product of the economy’s growth 
rate and the marginal utility of additional con- 
sumption. Depending on these parameter values, 
the social rate of return can be positive, zero, or 
even negative, if current actions lead to lower 
future growth rates. The preference parameter   is 
often confused with r. However, it is r that rational 
individuals should used to discount future costs 
and benefits. Even if all individuals have a con- 
stant   , r can vary across time or individuals due 
to differences in beliefs about g or differences in 
the other preference parameter   . 
While applying discounting based on the 
Ramsey Rule in typical policy analysis situa- 
tions may be fairly straightforward, many issues 
arise when evaluating centuries-scale environ- 
mental problems like climate change, nuclear 
waste storage, dams, and ecosystem restoration. 
As seen in Table 1, discount rates impact 
present discounted values by orders of magni- 
tude on a 200-year time scale and have a sub- 
stantial  impact  even  in  10-  or  30-year  time 
Among those who reject the validity of the 
Ramsey Rule on ethical grounds, the second 
debate, which we do not address here, is over 
whether discounting should be used at all for 
evaluating long-term environmental projects. 
The first debate has become more fluid over 
time, particularly in the realm of climate policy. 
The difficulties involved in obtaining “correct” 
empirical estimates of the parameters have been 
examined from a variety of perspectives. Be- 
cause use of the Ramsey Rule requires two 
estimated preference parameters, questions nat- 
urally arise about how people discount future 
costs and benefits. 
Although proponents of descriptive discount- 
ing agree that discount rates should be based on 
empirical values, there is no clear consensus on 
actual parameter values for long-lived environ- 
mental issues. Depending on the data, different 
market rate estimates emerge. For example, 
Mehra and Prescott (2003) show that in four 
different data sets the historical real “relatively 
riskless”  rate  of  return  varies  between  0.4% 
and 2.9%. These rates are based on very short- 
term instruments, such as U.S. Treasury bills. 
Long-term rates of return from the stock market 
or long-term high-grade corporate bond interest 
rates are also frequently invoked, particularly 
when reference is made to policies that would 
force business investment in pollution control 
equipment.3   Reference is sometimes made to 
the interest rates paid by consumers on their 
credit cards when upgrading consumer durables 
is required. However, in looking at policies with 
time horizons well beyond the 30-year maturity 
for U.S. Treasury bonds (e.g., water projects are 
often considered to have 50    year time hori- 
frames.2  Any project with costs that are primar-    
ily front-ended and benefits that stretch out over 
long periods of time looks less and less attrac- 
tive as the discount rate used to evaluate the 
project increases. 
Debate over the Ramsey Rule takes two 
forms. The first, among those who accept its 
validity, is over obtaining estimates of the pa- 
rameter values for   ,   , and g. Arrow et al., 
(1996) identified two main approaches to esti- 
mating these parameter values: the “descrip- 
tive” approach, which relies purely on empirical 
values such as market rates, and the “prescrip- 
tive” approach, in which the values of these 
parameters  are  based  on  ethical  arguments. 
2  To help put this table in perspective, the U.S. Office of 
Management  and  Budget  (OMB  Circular  A-94  Revised, 
1992) currently mandates that U.S. government agencies 
use a real (expected inflation removed) discount rate of 7% 
in benefit-cost analyses of government regulations. A dif- 
ferent and lower discount rate (  3%) based on current U.S. 
Treasury Department yields on its securities is allowed for 
evaluating purely internal government projects such as en- 
ergy efficiency investments in public buildings. 
3 The difference between the riskless rate of return on 
short-term U.S. government securities (  1%) and typical 
stock market returns (  7%) is often referred to as the equity 
premium puzzle and has close ties to the interpretation of the 
Ramsey Rule. Brekke and Johansson-Stenman (2008) make 
a connection between the discount rate used in evaluating 
climate change and the equity premium from a behavioral 
economics standpoint. 
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Table 1 
Present Discounted Value of 10 Trillion Dollars 
 
Discount rate (%) 10 years in the future 30 years in the future 200 years in the future 
 
0.0 10,000,000,000,000 10,000,000,000,000 10,000,000,000,000 
0.5 9,512,294,245,007 8,607,079,764,251 3,678,794,411,714 
1.0 9,048,374,180,360 7,408,182,206,817 1,353,352,832,366 
3.0 7,408,182,206,817 4,065,696,597,406 24,787,521,767 
5.0 6,065,306,597,126 2,231,301,601,484 453,999,298 
7.0 4,965,853,037,914 1,224,564,282,530 8,315,287 
10.0 3,678,794,411,714 497,870,683,679 20,612 
12.0 3,011,942,119,122 273,237,224,473 378 
 
 
zons and climate policies often look at 200-year 
time horizons), there are no accepted market 
guideposts to look at. 
The elasticity of marginal utility is often 
assumed to equal 1, which is consistent with the 
well-known  logarithmic  utility  function  u 
log(c), where c is consumption. Statistical evi- 
dence comes from two sources. Research from 
recent studies suggests values for the elasticity 
of marginal utility in a somewhat higher (1.2– 
1.4) range (Evans, 2005; Layard et al., 2008). 
However, in macroeconomics, which has long 
been focused on the intertemporal substitution 
in response to changes in interest rates, there are 
long-standing  disagreements  (e.g., Beaudry & 
van Wincoop, 1996; Hall, 1988), which place this 
elasticity either close to zero or close to one. This 
parameter also has an ethical dimension as it 
relates to preferences toward the distribution of 
income within a society or across countries (Das- 
gupta, 2008), with higher values being associated 
with a greater desire for equality. 
The pure time preference parameter    is dif- 
ficult to isolate from other factors in making 
empirical estimates, and hence is often inferred 
given a market based estimate of r and estimates 
for   g. This leads to the crux of the debate over 
climate change. Most defensible choices for r, 
including the lowest yielding long-term U.S. 
Treasury bonds, result in substantial estimates 
for   . For instance, Nordhaus and Boyer (2000) 
use an estimate of 3% for     in much of their 
work on climate change. Corporate bond rates 
or typical consumer interest rates can result in 
much larger estimates for   . 
A different and altogether more troubling sit- 
uation occurs if the same person exhibits differ- 
ent discount rates in various contexts. One can 
imagine here that a person might have different 
discount rates for automobile purchases, per- 
sonal health effects, and long-run climate poli- 
cies. Frederick, Loewenstein, and O’Donoghue 
(2002) discuss several “anomalies” in time pref- 
erence research that indicate that discount rates 
vary based on what individuals are discounting. 
For example, studies have shown that individ- 
uals discount differently if the amounts in ques- 
tion are smaller or larger, gains or losses, 
delayed or expedited, or in increasing or de- 
creasing sequences. In compiling data from 42 
experimental and field studies performed since 
1978, Frederick et al. (2002) also found that 
there has not been any methodological progress 
in narrowing the range of discount rate esti- 
mates over time, likely indicating that the stud- 
ies have not yet succeeded in isolating pure time 
preference from other factors influencing dis- 
counting. The way out of this dilemma is to 
follow the line advocated by Kopp and Portney 
(1999) who suggest conducting mock referenda 
in a survey context to capture the public’s will- 
ingness to pay (WTP) for specific proposals, as 





4  Recently researchers have started to use contingent val- 
uation surveys to look at various aspects of climate change 
programs (e.g., Cameron, 2005). Layton and Brown (2000) 
is perhaps the most directly relevant to the discussion here. 
They look at climate-related forest programs having impacts 
in 60 versus 150 years and show that WTP for the program 
with the 150-year time horizon is roughly 40% less than 
that for the 60-year program, which is consistent with an 
(exponential) discount rate of less than 1%. Carson et al. 
(1994) compare WTP for an accelerated ecosystem re- 
covery program for two treatments, one where natural 
recovery would take 50 years and one in which it would 
take 150 years, and find significant differences control- 
ling for respondent characteristics with an implicit dis- 
count rate estimate around 2%. 
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It is also possible to start from the reverse 
position and make an ethically based prescrip- 
tive choice for    and derive the r for use in 
evaluating policies. Environmentalists have ar- 
gued for years that the problem in evaluating 
government  dam  projects  was  the  artificially 
low discount rate favored by the U.S. Army 
Corps of Engineers. However, they strongly 
support using low discount rates in evaluating 
climate change projects. This highlights the fun- 
gible nature of basic preferences and discount- 
ing. While economists tend to steer clear of 
these sorts of value-based judgments, the 
extreme nature of issues like climate change and 
the potential total disregard of future genera- 
tions have prompted some economists to make 
ethically based arguments for setting discount 
rates. 
Stern (2007) cites arguments put forward by 
Ramsey, as well as other prominent economists 
such as Amartya Sen and Robert Solow, to the 
effect that the only reason to discount future gen- 
erations’ welfare is uncertainty about the existence 
of those future generations.5 This suggests that 
assuming the existence of future generations, 
one should use a pure time preference rate of 
zero for centuries-scale analyses, which is con- 
sistent with the idea that although the pure rate 
of time preference typically reflects impatience 
with respect to one’s own consumption, when 
the time horizon is on the scale of hundreds of 
years, discounting becomes more a question of 
intergenerational equity.6 
To operationalize this view, Stern (2007) sets 
equal to .1 (avoiding the zero problem by 
taking account of a small positive probability 
that all human life on the planet could end, say 
by being hit by a large asteroid), to 1 and g to 
approximately 1.3 to get r equal to 1.4.7  Much 
of the difference between the policy recommen- 
dation of the Stern Review to take immediate 
aggressive  action  on  climate  change  and  the 
more  traditional  economic  view  of  starting 
slowly and ramping up over time (associated 
with the work of Nordhaus) turns on the mag- 
nitude of r used (Dasgupta, 2007).8 
Implicit in the formulation of the Ramsey 
Rule given in equation (1) is the notion that 
the preference parameters    and    are invari- 
ant across time and type of policy. From a 
practical standpoint, g is usually assumed to 
be constant or very slowly changing. In actu- 
ality,  there  is  considerable  uncertainty  over 
all components of the Ramsey Rule. Issues 
also arise as to how to determine the correct 
value of     and     for policy purposes given 
that there may be a distribution of values for 
these parameters in the population of interest. 
Economists have long recognized that differ- 
ences in discount rates have large implica- 
tions for accumulating wealth. Furthermore, 
they have found ways to empirically estimate 
the underlying distribution of discount rates, 
which suggest that wealthier and more highly 
educated people have lower discount rates 
(Lawrance, 1991). Here, economists have 
generally accepted the market’s aggregation 
over individual agents. These issues therefore 
become particularly vexing if the policies of 
interest  involve  goods  not  routinely  bought 
and sold in the marketplace, so that reference 
to “market” rates cannot be made. As dis- 
cussed below, heterogeneity of preferences 





5 The usual argument against this approach (e.g., 
Montgomery, 1999) is that failure to use the market 
discount rate in policy evaluation can result in inefficien- 
cies. Economists taking this view often argue that inter- 
generational distribution goals should be addressed 
through redistribution after efficient policies have been 
set. Nordhaus (1999) points out that setting artificially 
low discount rates selected for ethical reasons may result 
in inefficient policies for climate change and tends to 
result in greater temperature changes, and therefore 
greater environmental damages than a policy aimed ex- 
plicitly at a target of climate stabilization. 
6 A zero discount rate implies that one cares about the 
welfare of someone a million years in the future as much as 
someone in the present. It also implies that the present 
generation should accept a subsistence level of living in 
order to invest in productive investments that will improve 
the well-being of future generations. This same logic then 
applies to each subsequent generation. 
7  Dasgupta (2008) points out an inconsistency in assum- 
ing a value for    close to zero and 1. Putting essentially 
equal weight on all future generations implies an almost 
infinite willingness to sacrifice current income to improve 
the well-being of future generations while using a value of 
that is close to one suggests the decision maker has little 
concern about the large degree of current cross-sectional 
inequality. 
8  For highly critical critiques of the Stern Review, includ- 
ing its discounting assumptions, see Tol and Yohe (2006) 
and Nordhaus (2007). Quiggin (2008) provides a nice over- 
view  of  the  various  controversies  that  have  sprung  up 
around the discounting approach used by the Stern Review 
and how they are linked. 
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Nonconstant Discount Rates 
 
Recent research on discounting in the context 
of long-term environmental problems has fo- 
cused a great deal on declining discount rates, 
where costs and benefits more distant in time 
are discounted at lower rates than nearer ones. 
Support for declining discount rates comes in 
the form of working with nonconstant or uncer- 
tain parameters for the Ramsey Rule, modifying 
the rule itself, or developing alternatives to the 
rule. 
The Ramsey Rule yields a nonconstant r if 
the values or associated uncertainty of any of 
the rule’s three components are not constant 
over time. First consider   . While a utility func- 
tion that is logarithmic in consumption is con- 
venient, there is no reason for    to be constant. 
Its value may depend upon income levels and 
borrowing constraints. 
The pure rate of time preference component has 
received the most attention because of the 
long  acknowledged  empirical  evidence  (e.g., 
Thaler, 1981) that people do not seem to engage 
in the sort of exponential discounting implied 
by (2).9  Behavioral economists and psycholo- 
gists (e.g., Laibson, 1997) have argued that hy- 
perbolic  discounting,  whereby  discount  rates 
are initially quite high relative to the exponen- 
tial discounting case and then at some point fall 
negative feedback to the economy that could 
manifest through reductions in g over time. In 
most policy simulations, these reductions are 
small and gradual. However, Weitzman (2009) 
has looked at the ties between low-probability 
catastrophic events and discount rates, finding 
that this extreme uncertainty can make standard 
cost benefit analyses arbitrarily inaccurate. 
If the growth rate is uncertain, then the Ram- 
sey Rule needs to be modified to take account of 
this uncertainty, even if the two preference pa- 
rameters     and     are constant. The most 
straightforward case has log-normally distrib- 
uted consumption with the growth rate g of 
consumption distributed N(  , s2), which is often 
assumed in asset pricing models. The Ramsey 
Rule can now be rewritten as: 
r    1/2   2s2.  (3) 
As discussed earlier, one can attack this prob- 
lem either by estimating the variability of r or 
by considering the properties of s.12  The first 
approach  was  followed  by  Weitzman  (1998, 
2001), who showed that when individuals have 
different constant discount rates the aggregate 
discount function is hyperbolic. To empirically 
look  at  the  issue,  he  surveyed  a  group  of 
over 2,000 professional economists and asked 
them to provide their preferred values of r for 
to substantially below the constant exponential    
discounting rate, provides a much better fit to 
the available empirical data.10  Proponents of 
hyperbolic discounting argue that it more accu- 
rately reflects observed discounting behavior 
and that the increased weight it places on ben- 
efits far into the future makes it more appropri- 
ate for evaluating long-lived environmental 
projects.11 
Historically, g has not been constant, because 
there have been periods of great productivity 
increases as well as periods of substantial in- 
come declines. Consumption growth looks very 
uncertain when looking hundreds of years into 
the future. Whether economies can grow indef- 
initely or are doomed to eventual stagnation is a 
long-standing debate on “limits to growth” 
(Weitzman, 1999). It is not even clear that 
growth will be positive hundreds of years into 
the future, let alone what the specific rate will 
be. One of the main issues that arises with 
climate change is the possibility of large scale 
9  Thaler (1981) found that the median prize that subjects 
would accept in order to delay an immediate $15 prize were 
$20  in  1  month,  $50  in  1  year,  and  $100  in  10  years, 
implying (exponential) discount rates of 345%, 120%, and 
19%, respectively. 
10 The question of whether hyperbolic discounting pro- 
vides an adequate as opposed to simply a better approxi- 
mation of what people do in practice still seems to be an 
open question. Rubenstein (2003) shows that some of the 
same experimental approaches that have been used to reject 
exponential discounting can also be used to reject hypoth- 
eses that logically follow from hyperbolic discounting. 
11  Sometimes a hybrid variant of hyperbolic discounting 
is advocated. Cline (1999), for example, proposes applying 
the conventional discount rate to the first 30 years of costs 
and benefits, a social rate of time preference involving 
shadow pricing, and a pure time preference of zero to all 
costs and benefits occurring in subsequent years. He sug- 
gests this as a way to counteract the “outright dismissal of 
future generations” because of the power of compound 
interest. 
12  It should be noted here that the introduction of uncer- 
tainty introduces two more potential sources of heterogene- 
ity. The first involves differences in beliefs concerning s, 
while the second involves differences in risk aversion now 
that the growth rate is characterized by uncertainty. 
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discounting a long-term project. The discount 
rates in his sample are asymmetric and are well 
fitted by a two-parameter gamma distribution. 
The mean discount rate is approximately 4%, 
with a SD of 3%. This leads to a 4% discount 
rate  being  approximately  appropriate  for  the 
first 5 years, a 3% discount rate for 6 to 25 
years, 2% for 26 to 75 years, 1% for 76 to 300 
years, and close to 0% after 300 years. Newell 
and Pizer (2003) estimate r using two centuries 
of U.S. interest rate data rather than just the 
post-World  War  II  experience  typically  used 
and obtain a numerically similar result. 
The second approach is examined by Weitz- 
man (2009) who argues that there is deep un- 
certainty surrounding s. This turns out to be a 
fundamentally more difficult question: What are 
the properties of s when there is the possibility 
of catastrophic harm? The main practical diffi- 
culty with respect to climate change, which 
Weitzman calls the “Dismal Theorem,” is that it 
is difficult to learn much about the high damage 
extreme right tail using existing data. This is 
because such events are rare and because hu- 
mans have not yet experienced similar condi- 
tions. Given the possibility of catastrophes, 
Weitzman’s analysis suggests that the use of a 
thin-tailed distribution (like the normal) for 
damages is inappropriate and shows that the 
situation is much better approximated by the use 
of a t-distribution with a low degree of freedom. 
Because s tends toward infinity in such a distri- 
bution, the implicit Ramsey Rule discount rate 
becomes increasingly small. Weitzman (2007) 
argues that Stern (2007) got things right but for 
the wrong reason. Its treatment of the Ramsey 
Rule in equation (1) was incorrect because the 
relevant equation is (3), and an appropriate treat- 
ment of the uncertainty surrounding climate 
change leads to the need for low discount rates, 
not the assumptions surrounding the pure rate of 
time preference     or the intertemporal rate of 
substitution   .13 
Gollier (2002a, 2002b) has also examined the 
impact of uncertainty on discounting. He finds 
that given prudence and decreasing risk aver- 
sion on the part of consumers, uncertain growth 
results in a declining socially optimal discount 
rate. In particular, he estimates that the discount 
rate for the medium term (defined as between 50 
and 100 years in the future) should be no greater 
than 5% and that in the very long run (more than 
200  years)  the  discount  rate  should  be 
around 1.5% (Gollier, 2002b). 
Following on this work, Groom, Koundouri, 
Panopoulou, and Pantelidis (2007) compare 
different discounting models’ forecasting per- 
formance as a means to select a model for 
determining certainty equivalent rates. They 
also examine the impact of implementing dif- 
ferent discounting models. They find that the 
statistical state space models, which are favored 
in terms of forecasting performance, result in a 
150% higher present value of carbon emissions 
reduction than a standard constant discount ap- 
proach. Hepburn, Koundouri, Panopoulou, and 
Pantelidis (2009) build on the aforementioned 
Newell and Pizer (2003) work to apply two 
methods to estimate four countries’ social dis- 
count rates. Consistent with other findings, they 
show that the regime-switching model which 
fits best with past interest rate behavior also 
corresponds to fairly rapidly declining certainty 
equivalent discount rates. 
Alternative approaches that take ethical con- 
siderations as starting points have also received 
some attention. Chichilnisky (1996, 1997) 
builds on two basic axioms for sustainability 
that imply there should be neither dictatorship 
of the present over the future nor of the future 
over the present. Working through various im- 
plications of this, she shows that in order to 
satisfy these axioms the discount rate must de- 
cline asymptotically to zero for a solution to 
exist (Chichilnisky, 1997). The welfare function 
she proposes for evaluation takes the form of a 
weighted average of a discounted utilitarian 
problem’s objective function and the undis- 
counted limiting utility. In a similar vein, Li and 
Lö fgren  (2000)  develop  a  model  in  which  a 
weighted average of the value functions of a 
conservationist (with a constant discount rate of 
zero) and a utilitarian (with a constant discount 
rate greater than zero) is used to evaluate a 
project. This model also leads to a declining 
discount rate, and is shown to have a stable 
steady-state solution. 
It follows that the case for declining discount 
rates  can  be  made  on  the  basis  of  empirical 
 
 
13  See  Nordhaus  (2009)  for  a  critique  of  Weitzman’s 
Dismal Theorem. 
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evidence, theoretical grounds and basic ethical 
arguments (see Groom, Hepburn, Koundouri, & 
Pearce (2005) and Pearce, Groom, Hepburn, & 
Koundouri (2003) for comprehensive examina- 
tions of the issues involved in using declining 
discount rates). Henderson and Bateman (1995) 
show that declining discount rates are already 
implicitly in use in public policies. In particular, 
there is a pattern of governments using unusu- 
ally low discount rates in evaluating intergen- 
erational projects. However, discount rates that 
are time varying for any reason can be problem- 
atic from a policy perspective because of time- 
inconsistency, and the possibility of wanting to 
reverse a previous action even though no other 
aspect of the situation, such as the available 
information set, has changed (Heal, 1998; 
Strotz, 1956). A policy implemented today that 
is based on a relatively low discount rate for 
distant future periods may not be adhered to 
when those future periods arrive and the policy 
is reevaluated at a higher near-term discount 
rate. As Horowitz (1996, p. 73) puts it: “future 
regulators will not want to follow the current 
regulator’s optimal plans, even when the 
current regulator has perfect foresight and there 
is no uncertainty.” One way to address this issue 
is to set up some sort of commitment, such as 
making investments in capital-intensive pollu- 
tion control equipment like scrubbers on power 
plants, so that future decision makers cannot 
easily back out of the investments made in 
earlier periods. 
When dealing with long-lived problems like 
climate change, the simple task of performing 
cost-benefit analyses to evaluate policies be- 
comes very complicated. Application of the 
standard Ramsey Rule requires parameters for 
which there is no market data given the time 
horizons. Using constant standard discount rates 
results in a complete disregard for the far- 
distant future and is not necessarily consistent 
with the way people really discount the future. 
Declining discount rates may solve many of 
these issues and have some theoretical founda- 
tions, although the issue of time-consistency 
remains a concern. Consensus on a robust ap- 
proach to discounting will significantly help 
with the credible evaluation of long-lived envi- 
ronmental problems. However, the successful 
implementation of these policies will also hinge 
on the ability to predict agents’ responses to 
different  incentives  in  making  intertemporal 
purchasing and consumption decisions. 
 
 
Purchasing Consumer Durables: The 
Achilles’ Heel of Energy Conservation 
 
If the analysis of preventing long-term cli- 
mate change is mired in a debate over how low 
the discount rate should be, the on-the-ground 
implementation of steps to combat climate 
change is bogged down by consumers and firms 
making decisions regarding the energy conser- 
vation attributes of appliances, automobiles, 
building improvements, and machines as if they 
have very high discount rates.14  Jaffe and 
Stavins (1994) refer to this as the paradox of the 
energy-efficiency gap. It lies at the heart of the 
contradictory bottom-up versus top-down esti- 
mates of effectiveness of policies to improve 
energy efficiency. 
The bottom-up approach uses a standard so- 
cial discount rate (3% to 7%) to look at life 
cycle financial implications of an action, like 
purchasing a new water heater to replace an 
older model. It predicts that consumers will 
purchase the new water heater if the net present 
value of the action is positive. The top-down 
approach looks at penetration rates over time as 
a function of the cost of an appliance and its 
associated energy. Consistent with consumers 
having very high discount rates, it predicts dra- 
matically less adoption and suggests that adop- 
tion rates go up with lower appliance prices and 
higher energy costs. Economists favor the top- 
down approach because it models actual behav- 
ior. By construction, forecasts based on the top- 
down approach tend to be reasonably accurate. 
But advocates of the bottom-up approach, in- 
cluding engineers and technology advocates, of- 
ten have the attention of policymakers because 
they sing the siren song of energy conservation 
on the cheap. In contrast, the economist’s story 
requires either subsidizing new energy technol- 
 
 
14  The  “as  if”  qualification here  is  important  because 
much economic analysis proceeds as if the only thing un- 
derlying the choice of whether to adopt an energy saving 
technology after the readily observable cost components 
were taken into account is the consumer’s implicit discount 
rate for making intertemporal tradeoffs. Many aspects of 
this approach have been questioned. 
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ogy  or  increasing  energy  prices  to  increase 
adoption rates.15 
The pioneering economic study on appliance 
adoption and implicit discount rates was Haus- 
man (1979), who looked at air conditioner pur- 
chases. Using data on sample household air 
conditioner models and utility bills, he esti- 
mated an implicit discount rate of about 25% 
per year on household purchasing decisions. 
He also found that discount rates varied neg- 
atively with income, ranging from 5% to 89% 
for the highest and lowest income categories, 
respectively.16 
With the energy crisis of the early 1980s, 
considerable attention has become focused on 
the appliance adoption issue. Train (1985) sur- 
veys studies that estimate discount rates involv- 
ing heating systems, air conditioners, refrigera- 
tors, water heaters, automobiles, and building 
efficiency upgrades. The studies take a variety 
of approaches to estimating discount rates and 
yield a broad range of results. Air conditioner 
discount rates range from 3% to 29%, while 
refrigerators are discounted at rates ranging 
from 39% to 100%. Fourteen of the studies 
Train (1985) reviews also examine the relation- 
ship between income and discount rates. In all 
instances, higher income levels are associated 
with lower discount rates. Subsequent studies 
continue  to  show  similar  results  for  a  wide 
range of consumer products (e.g., Dreyfus & 
Viscusi, 1995; Sultan & Winer, 1993). Winer 
(1997) argues that consumers are likely to have 
discount rates that differ both across product 
classes and attributes of products. 
Policy analysis is greatly complicated if dis- 
count rates vary with commodities and income. 
Resistance to incorporating this variance into 
analyses has encouraged a deeper examination 
of what lies behind the discount rates estimated 
by studies in the adoption of energy efficient 
technology. One key factor is that of liquidity 
constraints. Almost all of the economic models 
used to estimate implicit discount rates assume 
that individuals have unlimited access to credit 
at prevailing interest rates. This assumption is 
also built into engineering lifecycle analyses. 
However, this is clearly not the case. Lower 
income individuals may not be able to borrow 
much at all and likely pay significantly higher 
interest rates when they do. Credit card rates for 
consumers with poor credit are often in the 18% 
to 24% range, and other sources of credit run 
even higher. Thus, higher implicit discount 
rates for lower income individuals may not re- 
flect fundamental differences in preferences but 
simply  the  higher  interest  rates  available  to 
them and their lack of liquidity. 
The discount rate-education relationship sug- 
gests that the appearance of high discount rates 
may be driven in part by information asymme- 
tries/failures whereby many consumers do not 
have the same information used in engineering 
estimates of likely long-run cost reductions or 
have difficulties making the necessary calcula- 
tions. Again, the economic models used to es- 
timate the implicit discount rates and the engi- 
neering lifecycle models assume that consumers 
have full information. Closely related to informa- 
tion issues are uncertainties over future energy 
usage or prices, the possibility of adverse selec- 
tion, marginal cost-induced changes in use pat- 
terns and the concept of the full transaction cost 
associated with acquiring the commodity that may 
be considerably larger than its nominal price 
(Howarth & Sanstad, 1995). The key implication 
of all of these factors is that the underlying model 
used to estimate the discount rate, though consis- 
tent with observed behavior, is incorrect. 
The particular source of difficulty with a 
model can often have large policy implications 
because they tend to get incorporated in the 
discount  rate  estimate  (Metcalf  &  Rosenthal, 
1995).17  For example, in deciding whether to 
buy a hybrid car or the comparable standard 
gasoline model, a consumer may base her deci- 
sion on expectations of uncertain factors like 
future gas prices, the lifetime of the vehicle, the 
realization of reported mileage rates, and the 
prospects of even more fuel efficient vehicles 
being  available  next  year.  If  she  expects  to 
 
 
15  There have, of course, been some efforts to reconcile 
the main potential sources of the divergence between the 
bottom-up and top-down approaches (e.g., Koopmans and 
te Velde, 2001; Shama, 1983). 
16  Damon (2007) finds a 5% discount rate when looking at 
a recreational boat hull coating replacement decision using 
stated preference data with a very high income sample. 
17 Some of these effects act through the usual desire to 
retain flexibility of action in the future and avoid irrevers- 
ible investments. In this sense, the promise of much better 
technology around the corner can freeze adoption of cur- 
rently available technology, which is a large improvement 
over a household’s existing technology. Dixit and Pindyck 
(1994) provide an extensive discussion of investment under 
uncertainty. 
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drive 15,000 miles per year, believes the gov- 
ernment’s reported difference in mileage of 13 
miles per gallon between the two models, sees 
an initial sticker price cost difference of $5,000, 
and expects gas prices to be $2 per gallon on 
average, then she will expect to recover her 
initial extra outlay for the hybrid model after 
about 15 years. However, if she expects gas to 
cost $5 per gallon on average, then the addi- 
tional initial costs will be recovered in only 6 
years. 
Various adjustments have been made in the 
literature to address these sorts of issues. For 
instance, Kooreman (1995) focuses on the un- 
certain lifetimes of durable goods, arguing that 
discount rate estimates that do not account for 
these uncertainties may be substantially biased. 
As an illustration, Kooreman incorporates a 
lifetime uncertainty adjustment, recalculates the 
estimated 26% discount rate from Hausman 
(1979) to be 19% and argues that this new 
discount rate estimate is in line with consumer 
credit costs. 
A deeper problem is the divergence between 
the lifecycle engineering cost saving estimates 
and those actually experienced by consumers 
who adopt the energy saving technology. Look- 
ing at attic insulation investments, Metcalf and 
Hassett (1999) found actual returns of only 
about 10% versus engineering-estimated returns 
that suggested about a 50% cost savings. Thus, 
it is not unreasonable for consumers to be skep- 
tical of energy savings claims. Use of lower cost 
savings estimates can, of course, result in dra- 
matically lower estimates of implicit discount 
rates. 
In firms (and households), structural prob- 
lems can occur if budgetary authority over dif- 
ferent parts of the operation is given to different 
agents. The classic example is that of a main- 
tenance operation refusing to replace burnt out 
low-efficiency light bulbs with only marginally 
higher cost high-efficiency light bulbs (which 
would quickly pay for the cost differential with 
lower electricity bills) because maintenance 
pays for the new light bulbs while another part 
of the operation pays for the electricity. As long 
as the two groups are independently judged on 
their budgets, there is no reason for mainte- 
nance to put in the high-efficiency light bulbs, 
and the transaction cost involved in either hav- 
ing the agent paying the electric bill put up 
money or a higher authority in the company 
mandating the change can be large relative to 
the cost savings. This firm would appear to have 
a very high discount rate based on the choice of 
light bulbs. 
Motivated by early work that showed that the 
payment vehicle used could influence estimates 
of WTP (Mitchell & Carson, 1989), there is a 
strand of SP literature that looks at the nature of 
the stream of payment obligations that is critical 
to adoption decisions. Kahneman and Knetsch 
(1992) compare a single lump sum payment to 
annual payments for 5 years for a toxic waste 
facility in British Columbia and find that the 
median lump sum payment ($20) is equal to the 
median annual payment.18  They argue that their 
result suggests that people ignored the differ- 
ence in the payment obligation because they 
were not capable of discounting. The claim has 
been controversial for several reasons. The 
short question asked by Kahneman and Knetsch 
does not resemble the standard detailed contin- 
gent valuation (CV) survey (Smith, 1992). Fur- 
thermore, Carson et al. (1992) point out that 
with toxic wastes, annual payments ensure pro- 
vision, allaying the public fear that companies 
will walk away from their obligations. They 
look at a situation where payment duration is 
less likely to be tied to provision, installing and 
operating a scrubber on a power plant in Co- 
lumbus, Ohio. Median WTP for the one-time 
lump sum payment is twice that of the annual 
payment clearly rejecting ( p    .01) that respon- 
dents do not distinguish between the two pay- 
ment streams, but still suggesting high discount 
rates or borrowing constraints. 
From a practical standpoint, requiring initial 
connection costs to be paid as a single lump sum 
fee versus including this cost in monthly 
charges can have a large impact in developing 
countries with respect to the fraction of house- 
holds who decide to hook up to electricity, pipe 
water, and sewage. This strand of the literature 
continues to evolve with Kim and Haab (2009) 
providing a recent review. They point out that 
researchers on this topic have made potentially 
unwarranted assumptions about time separabil- 
ity in the utility function for tractability and 
 
 
18  Mean WTP is $141 for the lump sum payment versus 
$81 for the annual payment, but the authors argue that the 
mean estimates are strongly influenced by a small number 
of outliers. 
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have assumed that error variances across differ- 
ent temporal treatments are the same, which is 
also unlikely to be justified in many cases. 
The open question from a policy perspective 
is what should be done if implicit discount rates 
appear to be sufficiently high such that societal 
objectives for reducing energy consumption are 
unlikely to be met? The two competing poles 
are to (a) respect the public’s preferences and 
assume that they are better informed than the 
experts about their own particular situation, or 
(b) force people to adopt energy saving tech- 
nology under the guise that a high implicit dis- 
count rate represents either a mistake on the 
public’s part or something that should be ig- 
nored for the greater social good. Most econo- 
mists fall somewhere in the middle. They are 
willing to concede that there are likely to be 
substantial informational deficiencies where the 
government (and industry) can play a useful 
role.  They  also  believe  that  finding ways  to 
relax credit constraints may be important for 
key segments of society. On the other hand, 
they believe that the bottom-up engineering ap- 
proach favored by technology optimists and 
many decision makers will provide poor esti- 
mates of what is likely to actually happen on the 
ground and form a poor basis for policy analy- 
sis. Gillingham, Newell, and Palmer (2006) pro- 
vide a comprehensive review of these issues. 
 
The Temporal Pattern of Reducing Risk 
to Life 
 
The previous sections covered policies that 
deal with climate change and energy efficiency 
which are closely tied to traditional notions of 
production and consumption and their related 
ecosystem feedbacks. Many environmental pol- 
icies, however, are explicitly directed at reduc- 
ing risks to life. Moore and Viscusi (1990) 
provide a useful motivating example. A partic- 
ular pesticide regulation can be aimed at reduc- 
ing acute exposure to farm workers or it can be 
aimed at reducing pesticides in the food and 
water supply. In the first case, any health effects 
proach. These assumptions revolve around 
worker knowledge of risk levels and timing on 
different jobs and selection into jobs based on 
risk tolerance. Effectively, these assumptions 
also tend to move away from a static concept of 
maximum WTP to save a statistical life to the 
dynamic concept of saving life years.19  Differ- 
ent approaches yield discount rates ranging 
from 2% to 12%. 
While the hedonic pricing approach has re- 
mained the most popular one for looking at the 
value of statistical lives related to immediate 
work-related risk, attention has largely shifted 
to survey-based CV/SP approaches (Mitchell & 
Carson, 1989; Bateman et al., 2002) for dealing 
with nonwork-related and long-term risks. This 
shift in focus is largely due to the conceptual 
drawbacks of the hedonic wage approach for 
valuing risks to either children or the elderly 
who do not have current wage rates but are the 
focus of much government policy (Dickie & 
Ulrey, 2004). It is also because of the fact that 
the hedonic pricing approach assumes that peo- 
ple are aware of (a) the time profile of mortality 
risks on their current jobs, (b) the time profile of 
mortality risks on competing jobs, and (c) that 
the time profile of morbidity risks on their cur- 
rent and competing jobs is orthogonal. Assump- 
tion (a) has long been seen as dubious, although 
it is possible to make a reasonable argument that 
objective indicators of risk are strongly corre- 
lated with subjective measures and serve as a 
valid  statistical  instrument.  Assumptions  (b) 
and (c) seem untenable given recent work from 
SP studies (Bosworth, Cameron, & DeShazo, 
2009), which suggest that morbidity and mor- 
tality effects are substitutes and information 
about risk levels is often poor. 
The first study to use a CV survey to look at 
an explicit long-term health risk was Mitchell 
and Carson (1986), which examined WTP to 
reduce trihalomethane (THM) concentrations in 
drinking water. THMs are a class of low-level 
carcinogens that have been shown to cause uri- 
nary  tract  cancer  with  a  latency  period  of 
prevented  tend  to  be  immediate  while  in  the    
latter  case,  the  health  effects  prevented  may 
occur decades later. 
Moore and Viscusi (1990) lay out several 
approaches (and their key assumptions) that al- 
low the calculation of discount rates from ob- 
served wage rates using a hedonic pricing ap- 
19 WTP to save a statistical life is simply the average 
monetary amount the public is willing to give up to obtain 
a risk reduction of z (e.g., 1/10,000) multiplied by 1/z. The 
concept of a statistical life is based on the notion that many 
programs developed to save lives do not save specific lives 
but rather reduce the risk of the loss of life in the population 
of interest by small amounts. 
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over 20 years. The estimated value of a statis- 
tical life from the study is substantially lower 
than those obtained from hedonic wage studies. 
Initially, this puzzled many economists because 
they thought that CV surveys tended to overes- 
timate rather than underestimate. However, 
Carson, Flores, Martin, and Wright (1996), 
through a large meta-analysis, showed that on 
average, estimates from hedonic pricing studies 
tend to be higher than comparable estimates 
from CV studies. Furthermore, the estimated 
value of a statistical life was quite reasonable 
when compared to the range of consensus val- 
ues from hedonic studies if it was assumed that 
people had discounted their WTP with rates 
similar to those used by the government for 
policy evaluation (Carson & Mitchell, 2006). 
In a pair of related and highly influential papers 
Cropper, Aydede, and Portney (1992, 1994) ex- 
plored tradeoffs where respondents chose between 
programs that saved different numbers of lives in 
different years.20  There were three striking results 
in this work. The first was that the pattern of 
implicit discount rate estimates was more consis- 
tent with hyperbolic discounting, which was just 
beginning to be empirically explored in the eco- 
nomics literature (Thaler & Loewenstein, 1989), 
than exponential discounting, with discount rates 
declining from approximately 17% at 5 years to 
under 4% at 100 years. 
The second result was that there was consid- 
erable heterogeneity in the responses and a be- 
lief structure that made uncovering discount 
rates problematic. For instance, Cropper et al. 
(1994) found that approximately 10% of the 
respondents always chose a present-oriented 
program regardless of how many lives the fu- 
ture program would save. When asked why, 
roughly 10% believed that the future is suffi- 
ciently uncertain that it was impossible to make 
commitments to future policies, while over 20% 
believed technological progress would make it 
likely that more people in the future could be 
saved than the survey implied. Neither of these 
two beliefs is inherently irrational but they are 
inconsistent with the assumptions under which 
the implicit discount rate was estimated. Thus, 
individuals who do not believe the underlying 
claims in a situation, whether it is the premise of 
a survey or the claims made on behalf of a 
product, could even appear to have infinite dis- 
count rates. 
The  third  result  of  note  was  that  discount 
rates were estimated to be higher for older peo- 
ple, which advanced the possibility that older 
people placed a lower value on a statistical life, 
something termed a “senior discount” that has 
occupied considerable attention from subse- 
quent literature and policymakers.21  For exam- 
ple, using a large CV survey done in Taiwan, 
Hammitt and Liu (2004) look at the role of 
disease type and latency on WTP to reduce 
environmentally driven chronic degenerative 
diseases. They find WTP to avoid cancer to be 
about a third larger than otherwise similar non- 
cancer diseases and estimate an average implicit 
discount rate of 1.5% for a 20-year latency 
period. Alberini, Cropper, Krupnick, and Simon 
(2006) use data from two CV surveys conducted 
in Canada and the United States to show that 
substantially delaying the time at which a risk 
reduction occurs by 10 to 30 years can reduce 
WTP  by  more  than  60%  for  respondents 
aged 40 to 60. They find implicit discount rates 
ranging from 3% to 9% for Canada and 1% to 
6% for the United States depending on the treat- 
ment. Krupnick (2007) reviews this literature 
and concludes that while the larger studies using 
better statistical techniques tend to find age- 
related effects, where older people have lower 
 
 
20 These and most of the other articles in the environ- 
mental economics literature have followed the approach put 
forward by Horowitz and Carson (1990) of fixing the num- 
ber of (statistical) lives saved with the current period policy 
option and then randomly assigning respondents alternative 
policies that save different numbers of lives in the future. 
One can then determine the implicit distribution of discount 
rates in the population assuming an exponential discounting 
rule. Doing this for different time periods relative to the 
present allows one to determine whether the implied dis- 
count factors at each time period are (statistically) consis- 
tent with exponential discounting (Horowitz, 1991). Harri- 
son, Lau, and Williams (2002) conducted a large field 
experiment using a lottery approach for real money payoffs 
in Denmark to estimate the distribution of discount rates in 
the population using a variant of this basic approach. They 
found discount rates that lie in a plausible range but are 
higher than those generally used for policy analysis. They 
also found that discount rates are higher for periods less 
than 12 months than for longer time horizons, out to 3 years, 
and that higher income people have lower average discount 
rates. 
21 Canada has been using a discount rate of 25% for 
statistical lives for those over 65, the European Commission 
recommends using a value that declines over time, and the 
U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, after considerable 
controversy, has decided to use an age invariant rate (Aldy 
& Viscusi, 2007). 
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WTP, there is no robust useful policy finding, in 
part because other factors seem to play a large 
role.22 
Like other areas of discounting behavior, 
studies of WTP for reductions to life risks re- 
veal that individuals’ discounting preferences 
are influenced by their beliefs, vary with differ- 
ent types of risks (or goods), and are inversely 
related to time remaining (or wealth). Under- 
standing these types of preferences will help 
predict the level of public support for different 
types of environmental policies relating to life 
risk reductions. Before we examine how dis- 
count rates affect policymakers as they decide 
which policies to implement, we look at dis- 
counting in common property resources as an 
example of market failures leading to extreme 




The Curse of Infinite Discount Rates: 
Common Property Resources 
 
There are a number of natural resource sectors 
with discount related common access manage- 
ment problems including fisheries, common 
groundwater aquifers, hunting and trapping com- 
petitions that have driven animals to extinction, 
and forests in developing countries where expro- 
priation has led to premature deforestation.23  To 
examine the role of discounting in common 
property resources, consider a fishery in a con- 
tained area such as a very large lake. The quan- 
tities of interest are fish population size, number 
of fish caught, fish prices (which are assumed to 
be exogenous), and effort put into harvesting 
the fish. This effort is a function of factors like 
the number of fishing vessels, type of equip- 
ment, and number of hours spent fishing. The 
standard biological objective is a maximum sus- 
tainable yield (MSY), with a simple growth 
function like the logistic: 
 
dS/dt gS 1 S/K , 
 
where S is stock size, g the growth rate, K the 
carry  capacity,  and  no  stochastic  shocks  are 
assumed to occur. MSY is achieved when S 
K/2 and annual harvest is gK/4. 
The  standard  bioeconomic  model  (Clark, 
1976) recognizes that one can catch more fish 
now than the MSY, put the money in the bank 
earning a rate of interest r, but catch fewer fish 
in the future. The higher the interest rate, the 
lower the fish stock that maximizes the net 
present value of rents from the fishery. How- 
ever, if the marginal cost of fishing increases as 
fish stocks fall, the economically optimal catch 
may be less than the MSY.24 
If a fishery has a sole owner who expects to 
have continued control over the resources, the 
catch should be set to maximize the discounted 
net present value of all future net returns (Scott, 
1955). The more fish that are harvested now, the 
smaller the population that remains, the fewer 
fish will be available for harvest in future peri- 
ods, and the more expensive it will be to yield 
the same catch in future periods given the usual 
diminishing returns to scale assumptions. In 
maximizing net present value, the lower the 
discount rate, the more willing the owner will 
be to forgo current harvest opportunities for 
higher future yields. At the optimal solution, the 
marginal benefit of catching one more fish today 
equals the discounted present value of the mar- 
ginal future loss associated with that extra catch 
(Clark, 1976). Thus, with a discount rate of zero 
and no dependence of fishing cost on stock size, 
a sole owner optimizes by setting fishing levels 
to the MSY. 
This result does not hold if multiple boat 
owners are competing for the fish. If a boat 
owner does not pay rent to fish or bear the social 
costs of his activities, he is incentivized to har- 
vest as much as possible before others beat him 
 
 
22  Aldy and Viscusi (2007) provide a similar review of 
the hedonic wage literature and come to some of the same 
conclusions. They contend that theory and empirical evi- 
dence favor some temporal variation in the value of a 
statistical life year, but that the relationship can be compli- 
cated.  Indeed,  they  find  some  support  for  an  inverted 
U-shaped relationship between discount rates and age. But 
there are other factors also at work such as people becoming 
more risk averse as they grow older. 
23  A major reason advanced by Saddam Hussein for his 
invasion of Kuwait was that Kuwait was pumping the oil 
field that straddled the border of the two countries at a 
quicker rate than Iraq had wanted. 
24  After a certain level of effort, it is also often the case 
that each additional boat that enters a fishery to compete for 
fish lowers the amount of fish available in that fishery, 
thereby raising the costs of the other players (Clark, 1976). 
This increase in costs constitutes what is known as a con- 
gestion externality, a social cost not borne by the agent who 
has caused it. These congestion externalities have ties to 
discounting and can be seen as a type of coordination failure 
but will not be considered further here. 
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to it (Gordon, 1954). He maximizes economic 
returns by harvesting as much fish in the imme- 
diate term as economically viable, up to the 
point where marginal cost equals the price per 
unit. This effectively ignores the value of leav- 
ing the stock to grow, and it is straightforward 
to show that this behavior is equivalent to a sole 
owner  with  an  infinite  discount  rate  (Clark, 
1976). 
In response to this open access problem, gov- 
ernments regulate fisheries by setting total al- 
lowable catch (TAC) limits for many commer- 
cial fisheries. This solves the biological problem 
of preventing the fish stock from being deci- 
mated but does not solve the problem of open 
access driving economic rents in the fishery to 
zero. Boats race to catch the TAC, at which 
point the fishery is closed down. In extreme 
cases, the entire TAC may be caught in 1 or 2 
days, leaving a large amount of capital stock 
idle for much of the year. The way out of this 
dilemma is to give or sell tradable property 
rights known as individual transferable quotas 
(ITQs) to specific fractions of the TAC. First, 
the TAC is set using updated information on the 
condition of the fishery and the social discount 
rate. Second, the ITQ system allows individual 
fishing vessels to behave in accordance with 
their true discount rates, capturing lower costs 
by stretching out their fishing efforts over 
longer periods of time instead of catching as 
many fish as quickly as possible. Grafton, Kirk- 
ley, Kompas, and Squires (2006) provide an 
overview of most of the key fishery policy is- 
sues and the role discount rates play. 
Fisheries provide a good example of how 
individual agents’ intertemporal choices, (re- 
flecting extreme discounting) under unregulated 
market conditions, can be shaped by policies. 
However, achieving those efficient solutions re- 
quires political support. In the next section we 
explore the incentives motivating policymak- 
ers’ discount rates. 
 
Politicians, the Public, and the Possibility 
of Different Discount Rates 
 
The standard long-standing theoretical model 
for the actions of political representatives is the 
median voter model whereby politicians pursue 
the preferences of the median voter in the po- 
litical  district  they  represent  (Black,  1948).25 
This implies that an elected official’s discount 
rate should match the median voter’s discount 
rate. As such, discount rates can vary by district 
or region. It seems clear that voters in states 
such as California, which is pursuing environ- 
mental policies requiring long-term investments 
to reduce its greenhouse gas emissions, proba- 
bly have relatively low discount rates. 
The actual making of public policy decisions 
often diverges from what might be considered 
ideal. The public elects representatives to rep- 
resent their interests, but these political repre- 
sentatives do not always function as unbiased 
agents aggregating public preferences. Rather, 
the voting records of political representatives 
typically reflect both the public’s preferences 
and their own ideologies (Carson & Oppenhei- 
mer, 1984; Kalt & Zupan, 1984).26  Ultimately, 
it is these political representatives who vote on 
policy proposals, determine discount rates for 
policy analyses, and develop regulations or 
other incentives to counteract the negative im- 
pacts of a divergence between the high discount 
rates used by consumers and firms and the much 
lower discount rate(s) that are thought to be 
socially optimal. A key question then is: what 
are elected officials’ discount rates? 
In analyzing the political process of a se- 
quence of votes, Kramer (1977) describes 
“myopic” behavior on the part of politicians. He 
argues that “many observers have noted the 
relatively short horizons of elected officials and 
the fact that their preoccupations rarely extend 
beyond the next election.” A political represen- 
tative concerned about reelection has an incen- 
tive to champion policies with outcomes that 
can be realized in time for the next election 
rather than longer-term policies. This kind of 
behavior is akin to having a relatively high 
discount rate. 
Myopic behavior will be especially pro- 
nounced in elected officials who expect to win 
or lose the next election by a narrow margin of 
votes. On the other hand, a key insight of the 
 
 
25 A substantial literature has grown up around Black’s 
fundamental insight that makes modifications for party 
structure and ties between issues. The general result that 
reelection chances are maximized by moving toward the 
median voter (keeping campaign financing constant) is 
fairly robust to these modifications. 
26  This ideological deviation can reflect personal convic- 
tions or pecuniary gains and reduces the representative’s 
future election chances. 
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literature on estimating the ideology of individ- 
ual political representatives is that representa- 
tives in “safe” districts have more scope for 
exercising their own ideology. Politicians who 
reliably expect to win reelection by a wide 
margin or who decide not to run for reelection 
(whether voluntarily or due to term limits) 
should act more consistently with discount rates 
dictated by their personal values. Tien (2001), 
for instance, looks at voting behavior by mem- 
bers of the U.S. House of Representatives who 
voluntarily retire and shows that they exhibit 
larger deviations from the expected voting pat- 
terns for their districts than those running for 
reelection. It is an open question as to whether 
such officials tend to favor longer term projects 
than those facing close reelection contests.27 
Just as politicians can develop policies to 
shape individuals’ behaviors in different set- 
tings, institutional rules (e.g., U.S. Office of 
Management & Budget, 1992) can be formulated 
to address some of the issues above. Implement- 
ing procedures that require the application of spe- 
cific discount rates for specific settings or mandat- 
ing a certain level of transparency for the analyses 
performed in support of proposed policies can go 
a long way in countering some of the more self- 
serving activities in which politicians may be 
tempted to engage. And while politicians are, as 
individuals, often the ultimate decision makers, 
we come full circle by emphasizing the impor- 
tance of the work described in the previous 
sections. It is the role of social scientists, after 
all, to develop clear and consistent evaluation 
methodologies that are founded on solid theo- 
ries and evidence and that can help guide poli- 
ticians in making effective policy decisions that 




Timing decisions are affected by many fac- 
tors other than discounting. Liquidity con- 
straints, beliefs, structural problems in firms, 
risk aversion, and attitudes toward different 
commodities are examples of factors that may 
affect choices by individuals and firms with 
respect to timing. Whether using market-based 
or SP data, the inability to isolate discounting 
preferences from other factors makes it difficult 
to obtain definitive discount rate estimates. 
However, some consistencies do emerge from 
the data. 
Discounting behavior varies across individu- 
als and commodities. Wealthier individuals tend 
to have lower discount rates, probably because 
of their higher capital, better credit access, and 
possibly superior or more advanced education. 
Discount rates appear to decline as time periods 
increase, consistent more with hyperbolic dis- 
counting than the standard exponential model 
with a constant discount rate. However, even if 
each person held a constant discount rate, dif- 
ferences in those rates across individuals will 
result in a declining aggregated discount rate 
(Weitzman, 2001). 
These results and others raise serious issues 
for environmental policy analysis. On the one 
hand, there are those who believe that we can 
address issues like climate change largely 
through technology. However, technology 
adoption rates predicted based on standard dis- 
counting methods have been too high. Analyses 
that incorrectly rely upon assumptions like 
complete information and lack of liquidity con- 
straints run the risk of overestimating our ability 
to mitigate climate change through technology 
adoption. 
Likewise, applying standard discounting to 
benefit-cost analyses of centuries-scale policies 
can result in our undervaluing future costs and 
doing too little. While economists often prefer 
to rely on market data to estimate aggregate 
parameters, there is no market data on which to 
base discount rates for hundreds of years into 
the future. There is, as of yet, no clear consen- 
sus on how to approach such problems. Al- 
though standard discounting has the potential 
to discount enormous future amounts to unac- 
ceptably insignificant levels, discounting is 
nonetheless a powerful tool in identifying ef- 
ficient outcomes. 
Thus, the problems of environmental eco- 
nomics push the limits of discounting. Whereas 
pure rate of time preference usually reflects 
impatience, this perspective no longer applies 
when applied to time frames of 200 years. How 
can one be impatient with respect to something 
that will occur decades after one is no longer 
alive? We are instead dealing with questions of 
 
 
27 Because political representatives are almost always 
wealthier and better educated than the median constituent of 
their district, one would expect them to hold lower discount 
rates. 
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intergenerational equity, in the face of a great 
deal of uncertainty. 
As new ideas emerge on how to best evaluate 
policies that address these long-lived environ- 
mental problems, the final decisions on which 
plans to pursue lie in the hands of our elected 
officials. It is the discounting approach that is 
most palatable to our policymakers that will 
ultimately be used to evaluate policy decisions. 
As with the fisheries, incentives can be put in 
place to encourage the public to behave as if it 
has a lower or higher discount rate. However, it 
is not only discounting, but also the myriad 
other factors that drive all the little individual 
decisions on what refrigerators, light bulbs, and 
cars to buy that will determine how effectively 
environmental issues with long-term conse- 
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